Employment Research Newsletter
Volume 23

Number 2

Article 3

4-1-2016

Employment Research, Vol. 23, No. 2, April 2016

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/empl_research

Citation
W.E. Upjohn Institute. 2016. Employment Research. 23(2). https://doi.org/10.17848/1075-8445.23(2)

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

APRIL 2016

In this issue . . .
Marcus Dillender

Potential Effects of the
Affordable Care Act on
Workers’ Compensation
2016 Early Career
Research Award Winners
Ian Fillmore

Price Discrimination
and Public Policy in the
U.S. College Market
New and Recent Books
Vol. 23, No. 2
Employment Research is published
quarterly by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research. Issues appear in
January, April, July, and October.
The Institute is a nonprofit, independent
research organization devoted to finding and
promoting solutions to employment-related
problems at the international, national, state,
and local levels. The Institute is an activity
of the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee
Corporation, which was established in 1932
to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E.
Upjohn, founder of the Upjohn Company, to
conduct research on the causes and effects
of unemployment and seek measures for the
alleviation of the hardships suffered by the
unemployed.
W.E. Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
(269) 343-5541
www.upjohn.org
Randall W. Eberts
President

ISSN 1075–8445

Marcus Dillender

Potential Effects of the
Affordable Care Act on
Workers’ Compensation
This article draws from the author’s chapter in The
Economics of Health (Donald J. Meyer, ed.), which
was just published by the Upjohn Institute. See p. 7
for more information.

T

he passage of the Affordable Care
Act (ACA) represents one of the largest
overhauls to the U.S. health care system
since the introduction of Medicare and
Medicaid. Among the reform’s many
provisions are an employer mandate,
an individual mandate, an expansion
of Medicaid, subsidies for low-income
people to purchase coverage, and the
establishment of health insurance
exchanges. The ACA also reforms the
individual market and implements many
measures aimed at reducing medical
costs. Despite its many changes to the
health care system, the ACA largely
ignores workers’ compensation insurance,
which also deals with medical issues and
has an overlapping agenda with health
insurance. Although the ACA does not
address workers’ compensation, it could
have potentially major spillover effects
on these state-level programs. This
article considers the possible interactions
between workers’ compensation
insurance and the ACA.

Workers’ Compensation overvieW
Workers’ compensation insurance
pays all medical bills for individuals
with work-related injuries and diseases.

Because workers’ compensation is a
state-level program, each state’s is a
little different. In some states, private
insurance companies administer workers’
compensation, while in others, the states
are the sole providers of insurance. For
workers who miss more than 3–7 days
of work, workers’ compensation also
replaces lost wages through indemnity
benefits. The injured workers’ weekly
benefits are a function of their weekly
earnings and are subject to state-level
maximums. In all states except Texas
and Oklahoma, workers’ compensation
insurance is mandatory for employers.
In 2011, nearly 126 million workers
were covered by workers’ compensation
insurance (Sengupta, Baldwin, and Reno
2013). Employers paid over $77 billion
for coverage, and workers received
over $60 billion from the system. The
majority of workers’ compensation
cases—around 76 percent—are medicalonly cases and do not involve payments
for missed work. Figure 1 shows
workers’ compensation spending on
medical and wage replacement over
time. Spending for wage replacement
has been falling since the early 1990s,
while medical spending has continued
to rise. The share of medical benefits as
a percentage of the total benefits paid
for workers’ compensation rose from
around 30 percent in the early 1980s to
approximately 50 percent in 2011.
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Figure 1 Workers’ Compensation Medical and Indemnity Benefits by Year
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the aCa’s potential effeCt on
Workers’ Compensation
Filing Claims
The ACA can affect claiming in a
variety of ways. As discussed later, it
can change the labor force composition
and affect the number of people who
have work-related injuries, but it can
also affect who files for workers’
compensation. People without health
insurance theoretically have an increased
incentive to claim that their medical
issues are work related even if they
are not so that workers’ compensation
will pay the bills. Thus, having health
insurance may lower the incidence
of people misclassifying non-workrelated injuries. But even if an injury
occurs at work, health insurance may
still deter workers from filing a claim
if they prefer not to file for workers’
compensation. If this theoretical
relationship between health insurance and
workers’ compensation claiming holds in
practice, the ACA will reduce workers’
compensation claims by expanding health
insurance coverage.
Empirical research tends to support
the notion that having health insurance
coverage makes people less likely to
file for workers’ compensation. Biddle
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and Roberts (2003) surveyed Michigan
workers identified by physicians as
likely having work-related injuries. Of
these injured workers, only 30 percent
filed for workers’ compensation. Of
the 70 percent who did not file for
workers’ compensation, 36 percent cited
having health insurance as the reason.
Heaton (2012) studies the impact of
Massachusetts’s health insurance reform
on workers’ compensation by projecting
how many emergency room bills would
have been paid for by the state’s workers’
compensation system in the absence
of the 2006 reform based on 2005
Massachusetts data. Heaton finds that the
health care reform resulted in workers’
compensation paying for 5–10 percent
fewer emergency room medical bills.
In Dillender (2015a), I compare
workers in Texas just before and after
they turn 26, the age at which young
adults lose access to dependent coverage
under the ACA. This approach yields
estimates of the causal effect of health
insurance on workers’ compensation
filing. I find that immediately after people
turn 26, initial claims filed for injuries
with easy-to-delay reporting increase,
while the overall amount of medical
treatment that workers’ compensation
pays for increases by 8 percent. Despite
these increases, overall workers’

compensation medical costs do not rise
dramatically for 26-year-olds because the
majority of this increased care is for less
expensive services. These results suggest
that health insurance affects workers’
compensation filing, particularly at the
intensive margin, but not necessarily for
the types of services that drive medical
costs.
By influencing some people to file
claims with health insurance instead of
workers’ compensation, the ACA may
result in cost savings to the workers’
compensation system. However, the ACA
may also change the type of insurance
plans people have by encouraging the
use of more high-deductible plans
because it institutes a 40 percent excise
tax on health plans with individual
premiums above $10,200 and family
premiums above $27,500 starting in 2018
(Zuckerman 2010). Since people will
lack first-dollar coverage, they may be
more likely to shift claims onto workers’
compensation, which will still provide
first-dollar coverage.
Reimbursement Rates
One of the ACA’s measures aimed at
reducing Medicare costs is establishing
the Independent Payment Advisory
Board (IPAB), which will make
recommendations to cut Medicare
costs if they grow larger than the per
capita GDP plus one percentage point.
If Congress fails to pass an alternative
proposal with the same cost savings, the
IPAB recommendations will become law.
The IPAB curtailing Medicare costs by
cutting reimbursement rates could affect
workers’ compensation reimbursement
rates since some workers’ compensation
programs tie their workers’ compensation
reimbursement rates to Medicare’s.
While this provision of the ACA may
lower the amount of money workers’
compensation spends on medical
care, it may also cause providers in
these states to be less likely to accept
workers’ compensation patients since
they will receive less money for treating
them. Even in states that do not tie
their reimbursement rates to Medicare,
changes in Medicare rates may affect
workers’ compensation. Auerbach,
Heaton, and Brantley (2014) argue that
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when Medicare pays physicians less, it
may cause physicians to increase prices
for other payers or provide more services
to other patients that provide higher
margins. If Medicare no longer pays
providers for certain readmissions, it
may have the same effect if it decreases
physicians’ profits from Medicare
patients.
Labor Force Composition
Auerbach, Heaton, and Brantley
(2014) also argue that the ACA could
change the composition of the labor
force. A large literature in economics
finds that the need for health insurance
has induced people to participate in
the labor force (Antwi, Moriya, and
Simon 2013; Blau and Gilleskie 2001;
Buchmueller and Carpenter 2012;
Dillender 2015b; Nyce et al. 2013;
Strumpf 2010). Prior to the ACA,
there were few good health insurance
options for the near elderly outside of
employment. Auerbach, Heaton, and
Brantley argue that the exchanges and
subsidies will allow older people to retire
sooner, which may reduce costs since
older workers typically take longer to
recover from injuries and require more
treatment.
Population Health
If the ACA improves people’s health,
it may lower the likelihood that people
suffer injuries while at work. The notion
that health insurance improves health
finds broad empirical suport (Card,
Dobkin, and Maestas 2009; Doyle
2005; Finkelstein et al. 2012), and
Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) find
that people reported being in better health
as a result of the Massachusetts reform.
The ACA also has a focus on prevention
by eliminating copayments for preventive
services and including an annual wellness
visit as a part of Medicare.
Identifying More Efficient Treatment
By identifying effective treatments and
digitizing medical records, the ACA has
the potential to lower costs for medical
care paid under workers’ compensation.
An example of one of the ACA’s
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strategies to make medical treatment less
expensive is the establishment of the
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research
Institute, which focuses on identifying
effective treatments. The ACA also
implements rules that establish electronic
health records, which could also reduce
costs while improving care.
Shared Medical Resources
A potential issue with the dramatic
increase in insurance coverage promised
by the ACA is that it will put more stress
on existing medical resources. Hofer,
Abraham, and Moscovice (2011) point
out that there was already a shortage of
primary care doctors before the ACA and
suggest that the increased demand from
the ACA could increase the shortages.
Huang and Finegold (2013) find that
certain areas will be hit hard by an
increase in demand. They estimate that
7 million people live in areas where
demand for primary care may exceed
supply by 10 percent after the ACA.
Physician shortages may increase wait
times for injured workers before they can
receive medical care.

ConClusion
By overhauling the health insurance
system and making many broad changes
to medical care, the ACA promises to
change the health care landscape. This
article describes the implications of
the ACA for workers’ compensation
insurance. It reviews the considerable
evidence that points to a reduction in the
claiming rate for workers’ compensation.
The evidence also suggests that health
insurance covers some of the costs that
workers’ compensation insurance was
previously paying.
Apart from affecting claiming
behavior, the ACA will likely affect
workers’ compensation insurance in
other ways as well. The ACA’s many
cost-saving measures—especially those
that aim to identify the most effective
treatments—will likely have spillover
effects. The aspects of the ACA that aim
to improve population health may also
result in fewer work-related injuries,
thereby saving workers’ compensation
programs money. One negative aspect of

the ACA for workers’ compensation is
that the increase in insurance coverage
may put more strain on medical
resources, which could make seeing a
doctor more difficult.
References
Antwi, Yaa Akosa, Asako S. Moriya, and
Kosali Simon. 2013. “Effects of Federal
Policy to Insure Young Adults: Evidence from
the 2010 Affordable Care Act’s DependentCoverage Mandate.” American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy 5(4): 1–28.
Auerbach, David I., Paul Heaton, and
Ian Brantley. 2014. How Will the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act Affect
Liability Insurance Costs? Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation.
Biddle, Jeff, and Karen Roberts.
2003. “Claiming Behavior in Workers’
Compensation.” Journal of Risk and
Insurance 70(4): 759–780.
Blau, David M., and Donna B. Gilleskie.
2001. “Retiree Health Insurance and the
Labor Force Behavior of Older Men in the
1990s.” Review of Economics and Statistics
83(1): 64–80.
Buchmueller, Thomas, and Christopher
Carpenter. 2012. “The Effect of Requiring
Private Employers to Extend Health
Benefit Eligibility to Same-Sex Partners
of Employees: Evidence from California.”
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
31(2): 388–403.
Card, David, Carlos Dobkin, and Nicole
Maestas. 2009. “Does Medicare Save Lives?”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(2):
597–636.
Courtemanche, Charles J., and Daniela
Zapata. 2014. “Does Universal Coverage
Improve Health? The Massachusetts
Experience.” Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management 33(1): 36–69.
Dillender, Marcus. 2015a. “The Effect of
Health Insurance on Workers’ Compensation
Filing: Evidence from the Affordable Care
Act’s Age-Based Threshold for Dependent
Coverage.” Journal of Health Economics
43(September): 204–228.
———. 2015b. “Health Insurance and
Labor Force Participation: What Legal
Recognition Does for Same-Sex Couples.”
Contemporary Economic Policy 33(2):
381–394.

3

Employment Research
Doyle, Joseph J. Jr. 2005. “Health
Insurance, Treatment and Outcomes: Using
Auto Accidents as Health Shocks.” Review of
Economics and Statistics 87(2): 256–270.
Finkelstein, Amy, Sarah Taubman, Bill
Wright, Mira Bernstein, Jonathan Gruber,
Joseph P. Newhouse, Heidi Allen, and
Katherine Baicker. 2012. “The Oregon
Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence
from the First Year.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 127(3): 1057–1106.
Heaton, Paul. 2012. “The Impact of Health
Care Reform on Workers’ Compensation
Medical Care.” RAND Institute for Civil
Justice Technical Report. Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation.
Hofer, Adam N., Jean Abraham, and
Ira Moscovice. 2011. “Expansion of
Coverage under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act and Primary Care
Utilization.” Milbank Quarterly 89(1): 69–89.
Huang, Elbert S., and Kenneth Finegold.
2013. “Seven Million Americans Live in
Areas Where Demand for Primary Care May
Exceed Supply by More Than 10 percent.”
Health Affairs 32(3): 614–621.
Nyce, Steven, Sylvester J. Schieber, John
B. Shoven, Sita Nataraj Slavov, and David A.
Wise. 2013. “Does Retiree Health Insurance
Encourage Early Retirement?” Journal of
Public Economics 104: 40–51.
Sengupta, Ishita, Marjorie Baldwin, and
Virginia Reno. 2013. Workers’ Compensation:
Benefits, Coverage and Costs. Washington,
DC: National Academy of Social Insurance.
Strumpf, Erin. 2010. “EmployerSponsored Health Insurance for Early
Retirees: Impacts on Retirement, Health, and
Health Care.” International Journal of Health
Care Finance and Economics 10(2): 105–147.
Zuckerman, Stephen. 2010. “What Are the
Provisions in the New Law for Containing
Costs and How Effective Will They Be?”
Washington, DC: Urban Institute. http://
www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412194-ppacacontaining-costs.pdf (accessed September 4,
2015).
Marcus Dillender is an economist at the Upjohn
Institute.

4

APRIL 2016

2016 Early Career Research Award Winners
The Upjohn Institute announces the winners of the 2016 Early Career Research
Awards. These grants are intended to provide resources for junior faculty
(untenured and within six years of having earned a PhD) to carry out policyrelated research on labor market issues.
• Mark Borgschulte, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
“Labor Market and Program Participation Impacts of Health and Productivity
Shocks: Evidence from Forest Fire Smoke”
• Kevin Callison, Grand Valley State University
“The Effect of Paid Sick Leave Mandates on Labor and Health Outcomes”
• Bo Cowgill, Columbia University
“Labor Market Effects of Algorithmic Hiring: Evidence from Field and
Natural Experiments”
• Jeff Denning, Brigham Young University
“The Effects of Credit Constraints in College on Human Capital and
Labor Supply”
• Rafael Dix-Carneiro, Duke University
“The Impact of Labor Market Shocks on Household Financial Outcomes
and Migration”
• Ina Ganguli, University of Massachusetts Amherst
“Knowledge and Networking in Professional Labor Markets: Do Conferences
Impact Scientific Careers?”
• Seth Gershenson, American University
“Gender, Peer Advising, and College Success”
• John Horton, New York University
“The Effect of Demand Shocks on Human Capital Acquisition Strategies:
The Case of Adobe Flash Workers”
• L. Patten Mahler, Centre College
“Examining the Labor Market Effects of Public Pension Design”
• Ferran Elias Moreno, University of Copenhagen
“Understanding the Labor Market Effects of Legalizing
Undocumented Immigrants”
• Samuel Kleiner, Cornell University
“The Effects of Strikes on Hospital Production: Evidence from California”
• Olga Malkova, University of Kentucky
“The Effect of Pension Tax Reductions on Labor Supply”
• Mallory Vachon, Louisiana State University
“The Temporary Migration Response to Industry-Specific Shocks: Evidence
from the U.S. Shale Boom”
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Ian Fillmore

Price Discrimination and
Public Policy in the U.S.
College Market
E

ach year, over 80 percent of
incoming college freshmen in the United
States complete the Free Application
for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA).
The FAFSA collects detailed financial
information as well as a list of colleges
where the student is considering
attending. The government uses the
FAFSA information to determine
eligibility for federal aid, but because it
lacks the logistical capacity to dispense
aid on its own, it enlists colleges as
partners in distributing federal dollars
to college students. In the process, the
colleges a student lists on her application
receive full access to the student’s FAFSA
information, including information
about the student’s family income and
the number of potential competitors the
college is facing. This partnership of
sharing FAFSA information with colleges

Colleges only redistribute
35 percent of the “tax revenue”
they raise from using the
FAFSA to other students in
the form of lower prices; the
remaining 65 percent accrues
to the colleges in the form of
higher tuition revenue.
has been treated as a mere administrative
detail by students, parents, policymakers,
and even economists. It is not. As I
demonstrate, colleges use the FAFSA to
engage in substantial price discrimination
with widespread repercussions for the
cost of a college education as well as
the equilibrium sorting of students into
colleges.
Colleges in the United States charge
high sticker prices but routinely offer
discounts of varying sizes to their

students, which means that students
at the same college often pay vastly
different prices for the same education.
These discounts can be sizable and are
intended to influence the student’s choice
of which college to attend. For instance,
if a college has a posted sticker price of
$20,000 per year but it offers a student a
$15,000 discount, the relevant transaction
price is not $20,000 but $5,000. Each
college offers a similar “price quote’’ to
the student, and she chooses the college
that makes her the most attractive
offer, taking into account other college
characteristics that she values in addition
to price.1
Colleges care about the FAFSA
because it provides them with a source
of low-cost, high-quality information
about a student’s willingness-to-pay.
The information is low-cost because the
federal government bears the burden
of collecting it, and it is high-quality
because the government imposes fines or
jail time for misreporting information on
the FAFSA. Moreover, the application
comes bundled with a convenient
monitoring technology for ensuring that
its information is reliable. Thirty percent
of FAFSA forms are automatically
audited using IRS tax data. If a student’s
application is not randomly selected
for audit, then that student’s college
has full discretion to flag it for audit
anyway. Indeed many colleges simply
flag all of their students’ FAFSA forms.2
Effectively, the FAFSA grants colleges
generous access to the IRS and other
government databases and allows them
to use that information to learn about a
student’s willingness-to-pay.
Is sharing the FAFSA with colleges
a good policy choice? Specifically,
what would happen to prices, studentcollege sorting, and welfare if colleges
could not use it to price discriminate?

To answer these questions I build and
estimate a model of college pricing using
student-level data from the National
Postsecondary Student Aid Study.
I then use my estimates to simulate
counterfactuals wherein colleges are
unable to use the FAFSA to price
discriminate and find that there would be
four primary consequences.
First, with less ability to distinguish
between low and high willingness-to-pay
students, prices would vary less across
students. I estimate that the variance
in transaction prices among students at
the same elite college would fall by 19
percent.3
Second, transaction prices at elite
colleges would fall by $826 per student

Colleges care about the
FAFSA because it provides
them with a source of low-cost,
high-quality information about
a student’s willingness-to-pay.
per year, and consequently student
welfare would rise. However, the change
in prices would vary by income so that
students with parent adjusted gross
income of about $37,000 would see no
change in transaction price, those with
higher incomes would see their prices
fall, and those with lower incomes would
actually see their prices rise.4 Looking at
it differently, colleges use the FAFSA to
price discriminate in a way that amounts
to a 2 percent income tax coupled with
a $723 rebate, so the lowest income
students receive the rebate, but it is taxed
away as income rises. This is illustrated
in Figure 1, which plots average change
in a student’s transaction price (relative
to baseline) as a function of her parents’
adjusted gross income. Thus, colleges
use the FAFSA to charge wealthier
students more and poorer students less,
effectively using higher-income students
to subsidize lower-income students.
Nevertheless, Table 1 demonstrates that
colleges only redistribute 35 percent of
the “tax revenue” they raise from using
the FAFSA to other students in the form
of lower prices; the remaining 65 percent
accrues to the colleges in the form of
higher tuition revenue.
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Figure 1 Change in Price If FAFSA Information Is Restricted
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results demonstrate that this seemingly
unimportant administrative detail is
actually an important policy lever that
should be part of the current debate
around redesigning our federal financial
aid system. Taken as a whole, I find that
although allowing colleges to use FAFSA
information does increase efficiency
somewhat and lower prices for some
students, its main effect is to boost tuition
revenue, primarily at the expense of
middle- and high-income students.
Notes
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NOTE: The fitted values plotted here come from regressing the estimated change in price relative
to baseline on parent adjusted gross income (included as a fourth-order polynomial). No other
covariates were included.

The third consequence of preventing
colleges from using the FAFSA to price
discriminate is that 12.5 percent of
students who are currently attending elite
colleges would be inefficiently priced
out of the elite market and would attend
a nonelite college. This occurs because
colleges are no longer able to tailor their
prices as precisely. These mismatched
students consist of a mixture of lowincome students and high-income, lowability students.
Fourth, without direct information on
income, colleges will use other student
characteristics to engage in statistical
discrimination, which will tend to

reduce prices for minority students as
well as curtail merit-based aid (since
students with high test scores also tend
to have higher incomes). These results
all illustrate the extent to which giving
colleges access to FAFSA information
has affected the sorting of students into
elite and nonelite colleges, the prices
students pay, and the way those prices
vary across different types of students.
In summary, the federal government
has made a policy choice to share
FAFSA information with colleges. This
arrangement has been viewed as an
administrative detail by students, parents,
policymakers, and even economists. My

Table 1 Price Change Relative to Baseline by Income Group

Bottom third ($)
Middle third ($)
Top third ($)
Percent of “tax revenue” transferred
to other students (%)

FAFSA information restricted
Number of
Parent income
colleges listed
All FAFSA info
212
−242
428
−493
−361
−538
−1,908
−471
−2,312
17.0
45.8
35.4

NOTE: When colleges can no longer use the FAFSA to price discriminate, some students see their prices rise,
relative to baseline, while others see their prices fall. Each cell in the first three rows reports the average change
in price for students in the corresponding tercile of the distribution of parent adjusted gross income. The final
row reports the change in price for those who see their prices rise, divided by the change in price for those who
see their prices fall. This measures the degree to which colleges use FAFSA information to price discriminate in
a way that redistributes money from some students to others, versus simply boosting tuition revenues.
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1. Most high school seniors complete
the FAFSA at the same time as their college
applications. A primary reason for doing this
is so they can compare price offers when
choosing which college to attend. Research
by van der Klaauw (2002) demonstrates
that these discounts are indeed effective at
attracting students.
2. It appears to be public knowledge that
many colleges verify all of their FAFSA forms
(Grant 2006; Weston 2014).
3. Elite colleges consist of four-year
private colleges plus very selective public
colleges (which roughly correspond to
flagship state schools). Nonelite colleges then
consist of less-selective and non-selective
public colleges.
4. Roughly 30 percent of students at elite
colleges have parent adjusted gross income
below $36,886.
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New and Recent Books from Upjohn Press
Surviving Job Loss
NEW

Papermakers in
Maine and Minnesota

Kenneth A. Root and Rosemarie J. Park
Root and Park examine the plight
of workers displaced from two paper
mills and their paths to reemployment,
retirement
decisions, and the
personal struggles
they faced as a
result of their
dislocations.
They provide
insightful,
personal portraits
of workers that
are representative
of the hundreds who lost their jobs as
a result of two mill closings—one in
Sartell, Minnesota, and the other in
Bucksport, Maine.
In addition, the authors describe the
types of assistance that were offered
to the workers displaced by the mill
closings, dedicate a chapter each to
the plights of female workers and of
spouses who were both displaced by
the closings, discuss the importance
of community when economic
displacement occurs, compare the
experience of a mill closing in Canada
with the Maine and Minnesota closings,
and conclude with ways that society
can be more proactive in assisting
workers who suffer job displacement
and the economic and psychological
impacts that so often occur as a result.
Overall, this book adds a human
perspective to the problems facing
dislocated workers, not only in the
shrinking paper industry but also in
other contracting industries in the
United States.
251 pp. 2016
$19.99 paper 978-0-88099-507-8
PDF is free at research.upjohn.org/
up_press/237/

The Economics
of Health
NEW
Donald J. Meyer, ed.
The choices we make concerning our
health have consequences that are felt
both personally and economy-wide. On
the personal level,
good health allows
us to function
freely, earn a living,
interact with family,
friends, and coworkers, and to
generally enjoy life.
Each individual’s
health-related
decisions also play
a role in the nation’s health care economy,
which now represents some 17 percent
of the nation’s GDP with projections
that it will reach nearly 20 percent by
2024. Therefore, policies and actions that
encourage healthy living, along with a
streamlined health care system, can have
positive impacts on a large and growing
portion of the nation’s economy.
In this timely collection, editor
Donald J. Meyer leads a group of notable
health economists who explore critical
issues—and their economic impacts—
facing health care today. These include
lifestyle choices and their health impacts,
decisions on medical care and self-care,
the fee-for-service payment model,
disability and workers’ compensation
insurance claims, long-term care, and
how various aspects of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA) impact the nation’s health care
system.
Contributors include M. Kate Bundorf,
Marcus Dillender, John H. Goddeeris,
Donald J. Meyer, Edward C. Norton, and
Charles E. Phelps.
155 pp. 2016
$40 cloth 978-0-88099-463-7
$15 paper 978-0-88099-462-0
PDF is free at research.upjohn.org/
up_press/238/

Downloaded over 6,000 times!

From Preschool
to Prosperity

The Economic Payoff to
Early Childhood Education
Timothy J. Bartik
Bartik shows that investment in
high-quality early childhood education
has several longterm benefits,
including higher
adult earnings
for program
participants.
“The
economic benefits
of investing in
high-quality
early childhood
education are clear and backed by an
impressive amount of research, as laid
out in Tim Bartik’s book.” –Arthur J.
Rolnick, former Senior Vice President
and Director of Research, Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
“This new book makes a
comprehensive and compelling case for
a strong public commitment to early
childhood education.” –Nancy Folbre,
Professor of Economics Emerita,
University of Massachusetts Amherst
“Tim Bartik explains how early
learning investment can strengthen
the national economy and address
economic inequality by increasing
economic opportunity. Are there
today any two economic topics more
crucial than these?” –Robert Dugger,
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